



SAuth: protecting user accounts from password database leaks

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Who am I?



- University of Cyprus - Computer Science
 - Assistant professor
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 - 4 PhD student
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 - Research theme is System Security and Privacy
 - More: <https://srec.cs.ucy.ac.cy>

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YET, ANOTHER PASSWORDS TALK

Don't reuse passwords!

I saw your password in a post-it note!

Phishing!

Enable 2FA!

Use _%^\$!, capitals, and at least 2 numbers!

Change your password every 3 months!

Use a password manager!

"Nobody gets hacked. To get hacked you need somebody with 197 IQ and he needs about 15 percent of your password."



From **Ira Goldman** 🍌🍌🍌

12:28 AM · Oct 20, 2020 · Twitter Web App



**YET, ANOTHER PASSWORDS
TALK, BUT NOT A BLAME-THE-USERS
TALK**

Blame the services!



';--have i been pwned?

Check if you have an account that has been compromised in a data breach

email address

pwned?



Generate secure, unique passwords for every account

[Learn more at 1Password.com](https://1password.com)

277

pwned websites

4,966,062,037

pwned accounts

67,965

pastes

74,843,649

paste accounts

What can go wrong?



Achilles




Hector






Patroclus

HOW TO PROTECT PASSWORDS?

Cryptographic Hash Function



Basic Requirements



Threat Model



- Text-based passwords are stored in databases
- They are stored cryptographically hashed
- Databases can be leaked
- Cryptographic hashes can be cracked
- Other Interesting threat models
 - Phishing and social engineering attacks



Can we harden authentication and keep the "password" interface?

SAuth: Synergy-based Enhanced Authentication



- We propose: cooperating sites pool authentication resources*

User Agent



Alice

Evernote




Twitter



SAuth: Synergy-based Enhanced Authentication



- We propose: cooperating sites pool authentication resources*



Why it works?



- Password reminders utilize vouching when the password is lost
- SAuth implicitly initiates such a password reminder on the background
- SAuth does this by pairing arbitrary services

Password Reuse Woes



Stolen passwords re-used to attack Best Buy accounts

Summary: *Customer re-use of the same user name and password across multiple sites is being blamed for attacks on customer accounts at BestBuy.com.*

Decoy Passwords

- Uncertainty about the actual password
- Store N-1 decoy passwords along
- Attack reduced to online guessing
- All decoys are valid passwords, server does not know the difference

Username

<i>P[0]</i>	<i>P[1]</i>	<i>P[...]</i>	<i>P[N]</i>
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- How many decoys?
 - *16,384 for NIST L2 security when password is reused*

HoneyGen



- Generate honeywords using Machine Learning (ML) techniques




Figure 1: HoneyGen receives i_{th} user's Real Password (RP_i) and responds with an enriched with $(k - 1)$ honeywords passwords list containing k sweetwords (SWs) in total. Then, the returned SWs are hashed (according to each operator's hash function $h()$) and stored in the password file F .

Idea 1:

Random perturbations



- Randomly replace characters from a given password
- Problems:
 - Random generated passwords can be easily distinguished
 - Random generated passwords might not comply with the websites' policies
 - Not generic enough

Idea 2:

Probabilistic Model



- Train a model on each operator's password corpus and return as honeywords the top-k nearest neighbours of a given password
- Benefits:
 - Returned passwords match each website's password policies
 - This approach accurately models the password selection behaviour of each website
 - Realistic looking honeywords (they are actual passwords of other users)
- Problems:
 - limited honeywords generation spectrum (no new honeywords can be generated apart from those that already exist in each operator's password corpus)
 - The model-based approach can be reversed

Evaluation – User Study




Figure 6: The flatness graph and the distribution of confidence for the user study's collected results for $T_1 = 1$ up to $T_1 = 5$, using chaffing-with-a-hybrid-model.

Take Away



- Passwords are associated with several problems
 - Not always the user's fault
- Combining services with vouching can be done not just for resetting the password
 - Raising the bar for the attackers
- Generating decoy passwords is a hard problem
 - ML can help