

HY537: Έλεγχος Πόρων και Επίδοση σε
Ευρυζωνικά Δίκτυα

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Pricing and network control
Incentives
Simple modeling

Network externalities

- **Network externalities**: action by one user affects all other users
- **Positive externalities**: value of a network increases as square of users (Metcalfe's law)
- **Negative externalities**: when a user accesses a shared resource it increases congestion which affects all users
- **Positive externality** in peer-to-peer networks: all peers benefit when one peer shares its resources

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Pricing

- **Prices affect demand**: e.g. lowering prices increases demand
- Prices can be used to **control congestion**
- Competition can drive prices to **marginal cost**
 - Large fixed cost of constructing a network
 - If there is no congestion, marginal cost of providing one additional unit of service is almost zero
- Networks and information goods: **costly to produce** but **cheap to reproduce** (sunk cost, zero marginal cost)
- But networks also have **operational and maintenance costs** (including billing)
- Another difference: **networks can get congested**

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Features of communications market

- All data transport services are simply means of **transporting bits** at a **given quality**
- Can use this basic service for providing other **value added services**
- Statistical multiplexing => overbooking
 - Traffic is bursty
 - Economy of scales: larger network => more efficient multiplexing
- Flexible, multidimensional SLAs
- Exchange of signals on **fast timescales** => **renegotiation**
- Commoditized wholesale market
 - Internet is a “stupid” network, hence can be efficiently engineered
 - Also reason for its success
 - Intelligence at edges

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Role of economics

- **Decentralized control mechanisms**
 - Use price and congestion signals to provide incentives
- **Engineering performance**: in terms of utilization, delay, blocking, etc
- **Economic efficiency**: include the “value” that customers obtain from using the network
- Entities (users-customer, network) are **rational**, seeking to **maximize their own benefit**

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
Overprovision or control ?

- Overprovisioning possible in the core
- May be more difficult in metropolitan and even more so in access networks
 - Used by fewer customers
 - Much more costly than core
- May be impossible in wireless networks

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Some thoughts on charging ...


- **There is no unique view on charging for network services**
 - Disparate models, contradicting proposals
- **There is no need for pricing network services!**
 - No congestion in the future
 - price only content
- **There is nothing new! (Economists did everything already)**
 - yes and no!
 - economists need simple models to work with => **abstraction**
 - what is really relevant?



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Our view on charging

- **Charging is not only for making profits, but for**
 - improving network performance
 - providing **stability and robustness**
 - creating revenue
- **Charging should provide**
 - **incentive compatibility to users**
 - **important information to network control**
- **Charging should be**
 - simple but not simplistic
 - understandable
 - implementable
 - competitive



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Network control and pricing

- Set of feasible services depends on network control mechanisms
- Economic incentives influence network control mechanisms
- Communication service contracts (Service Level Agreements - SLAs) provide substantial flexibility, and ability to exchange economic signals on fast timescale
- **Network control**: controls cell flows to guarantee contracts
- **Pricing**: controls demand in order to increase efficiency

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Why Charge for Telecommunication Services ?

- In order for the Network (or Service) Provider to:
 - Recover costs
 - Make profits and save capital for future expansion
 - Control the system:
 - examples: charging of applications for admission to U.S. universities
charging for street-parking in Athens
 - Obtain information from users:
 - examples: special long-distance call packages in U.S.A.
=> their adoption is indicative of user's *future* behavior

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Types of Charge

- There are four types of charge:
 - Fixed charge
 - Usage charge
 - Congestion charge
 - Quality charge
- A charge of a telecommunication service constitutes a combination of the above components, which may overlap

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Coca Cola's dynamic pricing experiment

- Added *thermometer* to vending machine
- Automatically *raised prices* when weather was *hot*
- Rational:
 - a coke has more *value* to people during *hot* weather
 - *higher demand* during hot weather, hence *higher prices*



Back to Coca Cola's dynamic pricing experiment ...

Was it successful ?

- Prices didn't track *congestion* well...
 - What they did:
 - increase of *temperature* \Rightarrow increase of price
 - What they could have done:
 - decrease of buyer *inter-arrival time* \Rightarrow increase of price, or
 - decrease of *supply* \Rightarrow increase of price
- \rightarrow Method for detecting congestion



Incentives

- A charging scheme influences users' *demand* and behavior, according to the *incentives* it offers to the user, regarding how to maximise his *own utility* (benefit from service vs charge)
- Each individual user's behavior influences the *global* well-being (social welfare) of the society (users and network)
- A charging scheme is *incentive compatible* if individual user utility optimisation *also* results in social welfare optimisation


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Incentives

- Flat rate versus usage charging
 - Example: all-you-can eat
- Time of day charging in telephony
- Dynamic pricing in an Internet Café
 - Fixed price per ticket
 - Normal & peak periods: duration depends on # of users
- Taxi tariffs: $a+b*T+c*X$, where
 - a,b,c: tariffs parameters
 - T: duration, X: distance
 - T,X mutually exclusive: if speed small then charge T, else X
 - Large b: incentive for driver to increase duration (drive fast between lights, and wait long time at lights)
 - During day when demand is high: make trips short, accommodate more people, and take advantage of fixed charge a

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A proposal for pricing



- **Quality differentiation:** guaranteed, best-effort,
 - low-high delay, blocking, reliability, access
- Prices differentiate **quality** of service, **not content**
- Prices depend on **demand**, driven towards cost by competition;
- Price relation defined by **substitution**; proportional to
 - *effective bandwidths* for guaranteed services
 - *throughput* for best effort services

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Single resource model

- Single link with capacity C , shared by N customers
- How should it be shared ?
- Solution 1: Each user can get C/N
- But what if some users have demand $< C/N$?
 - Bandwidth is wasted
- Solution 2: fair sharing (allocate resources iteratively)
 - At each step t , allocate to each user C_t/N_t
 - Next step C_{t+1} =remaining bandwidth
- But all users do not value bandwidth equally...

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Taking into account user utility

- User utility: $u_i(x_i)$
- Global planning problem:

$$\max_{\{x_i\}} \sum_i u_i(x_i) \quad s.t. \quad \sum_i x_i \leq C$$

- But, difficult to know all utilities

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$$\max_{\{x_i\}} \sum_i u_i(x_i) \quad s.t. \quad \sum_i x_i \leq C$$

- But, difficult to know all utilities
- Under conditions (utility is concave), the above can be solved distributed using prices and allowing each user i to solve

$$\max_{x_i} \{u_i(x_i) - px_i\}$$

- Price p set such that $\sum_i x_i(p) = C$

- Demand function $x_i(p)$

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Properties of approach

- Network does not need to know utility of all users
- Decentralized solution, each user acts to maximize their own benefit
- Sharing done by users, not internal network mechanisms
 - Network only provides “price” (=congestion signal)
- Incentive compatibility: best solution for each user maximizes aggregate utility (social welfare)
- Efficient (economic) resource utilization: capacity is used in full, by those who value it most

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Network revenue and user surplus

- Network revenue $p \sum_i x_i(p) = pC$
- User surplus: $u_i(x_i) - px_i$
- Under no competition or regulation, provider might want to obtain all surplus
 - Take-it-or-leave-it offer: $u_i(x_i) - e$
 - Different price p_i to different users
 - Nonlinear prices (e.g. $a+b*x$)

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